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Abstract
The 2015 refugee waves to Europe were a humanitarian, legal, moral and logistical crisis. Those
circumstances arose ideas to call upon armies to serve at borders. This paper will analyze all elements of
the refugee crisis that could legitimate or deny the use of military forces in protection of state borders.
More precisely, there are international obligations for governments to protect refugees and to provide
security for its citizens. In an age of terrorist threats, roles of the police and military are shifting in an
unknown direction, but those international obligations remain the same. The Refugee crisis challenged
not only international law, but also EU policies and ethical principles. Possible solutions were to accept
all refugees or to close borders, and somewhere in between those solutions army was considered as a tool.
Many have emphasized that there is no place for military personnel at state borders with or without the
refugee inflow. That is why in this paper it will be examined what are the arguments for that "military
ban". Furthermore, after a thorough analysis a comprehensive answer to the legal, moral and logistical
legitimacy of army at borders use will be offered. With that conclusion, Hungarian, Slovenian and
Croatian legislative will be commented and compared. Specially, having in mind possible future problems
that could arise from differences in their legislative linked to migration and refugee inflows that may
occur.
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1. Introduction
In the heat of the migrant crisis of 2015 some European countries have decided to call
upon their armies to serve and protect at their borders. At the time nobody was exactly sure what
the armies were doing or what were their responsibilities at the state borders. Questions that
arose were if Europe was closing gates for migrants and armies were there to strengthen the
position and disable the passage, or if their role was supposed to be just supportive and
subsidiary. The situation was more than troubled because there were a lot of elements that caused
confusion and even panic within the European citizenships. There were no clear signs of any
distinct political plan or agenda on the migrant crisis, no one offered answers as to what extent
will the migrants be welcomed, which countries they will be situated in, and how the whole
situation will evolve. Soon it was realized that among the migrants, there were also ISIL
terrorists exploiting the situation which represented a great security threat. Because of that, there
were problematic commentaries in international and domestic public opinions. The tensions were
high, and the public was divided between acceptance of refugees or complete closing of borders
for them. In those circumstances, governments of Austria and Hungary decided to send army
forces to the borders. It was then that the public started to ask if that was a sign of militarization
of borders and if force will be applied against people? Suddenly, there were more and more
comments that military forces shouldn`t be sent to the borders. Some of the opinions were based
on the stand that all refugees are welcome, but there were more voices that were directed only
against the military, and the legitimacy of their role in this crisis. That is why this paper aims to
analyze all elements of the migrant crisis that could impact the circumstances in which the role
of military could be justified and in what way.
Firstly, some statistical information will be shown to stress how big of a logistical and
humanitarian refugee crisis really was. With that in mind, analysis of international legal
instrument and states’ obligations on their borders will be brought in correlation with the
numbers of legal and illegal entries and the man power necessary for that task. Especially if we
have in mind how hard it was to differentiate real refugees from economic migrants. It will be
argued if that situation and process fall in the scope of extraordinary. If that was the case, in
extraordinary time special tolls and regimes could be recognized as a legal and legitimate
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answer. Related to this, a legal theory of a social contract will be brought to this crisis. It could
give answers to the legitimacy of military help on the borders and give a comprehensive solution
on how to help refugees in a time were human rights are highly protected and breached.
To explain another problematic aspect of military on borders, cooperation between army
and police will be taken apart to recognize some issues that may occur, especially to analyze the
possibility and need for military to have police power on the borders. In addition, realistic and
hypothetical examples will be given to show a different approach to this specific situation, and to
explain that sometimes ideal stands cannot solve the problem. That will also help to understand
the role of the governments during the refugee crisis which have serious concerns on their behalf,
and they should determine how the army forces will be used to respond to all issues.
Furthermore, an analysis will be presented on how different European countries have
answered on the migrant crisis, in particular Slovenia, Hungary and Croatia. The highlight will
be on the military aspect of their response and how they differ from each other. This will
introduce an EU perspective to the problem, but also bring up the following question. How is it
possible that EU countries have so different and gravely approaches to what is otherwise
considered Common European Asylum System.
Bearing in mind the complex situation that migration generally is, mixed with legality,
security and morality uncertainties, there are some objective conclusions around which a
comprehensive solution and policies should be built. That is why, after a thorough analysis of all
the elements of the migrant crisis that could affect the military aspect considered in this paper, an
answer to the legitimacy and justification of their use will be offered.

2. Refugee crisis in numbers
The exact number of people who entered the EU with the migrant wave is quite hard, or
even impossible to define. However, even the official and known numbers clearly emphasize the
seriousness of the situation that occurred. In 2015, 1.26 million people applied for the asylum in
the EU. The number got up to 2.5 million when 2016 is added to the sum.1 But the data that
frightens the most is 2.3 million illegal crossings that were detected. 2 Some could say that there
1

Available on: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/eumigrant-crisis-facts-and-figures, last checked: 21/03/2018.
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were people detected more than once in the illegal crossings, which is completely true. Still, that
number is excessively too high that we could claim the situation was handled well and with a
plan. Moreover, 2.2 million people were found illegally present (people that failed to register
properly or who have left the country of the asylum claim) in the EU, and the year later, in 2016,
that number dropped to 984.000.3 More interestingly, in 2015 533.000 people were ordered to
return to their state but only 43% did, while a year later only a half of 494,000 ordered have
returned home.4 In addition, the most troublesome data is that in two and a half years, from 2015
and only in the Mediterranean, around 10.000 people lost their lives trying to get to Europe.
Also, 388.000 people were denied entry on the external borders of the EU, because they were
considered economic migrants.5 That should be more than enough to describe the intense, and
never seen, pressure suddenly put on the European countries’ borders. This data is an obvious
indicator of a logistical mess that, among all the others, stumbled upon Croatia, Slovenia and
Hungary as well. This is when the use of military forces got in question. For example, we could
imagine a country where snow falls only 2 days a year, but it falls so heavily that all the traffic is
paralyzed. For traffic to function regularly, 300 expensive snowplows would be needed. These
snowplows would obviously work only two days a year, while for the rest of the time, they
would be a dead inventory. This simple example can be easily transferred to Croatia during the
refugee crisis. Usually, there are only small numbers of migrants, refugees, or other illegal
entries in the country, but suddenly there are 800.000 refugees passing through Croatia.6 In a
normal year, not many employees are needed to establish an efficient border control, but during
the crisis they are not enough. There is a need to employ more people, but this new employment
would after the hard times, just like those 300 expensive snowplows, become an unnecessary
surplus. In addition, it is needed to stress that Croatia through its history was mostly familiar
with the process of emigration, not immigration. In those circumstances of unknown immigration
process and with a huge lack of manpower it is not that strange to understand solutions for which
governments reach. As it would be expected, most countries turn to the first field similar to the
police which is usually used to help in the state of emergency - military forces.
3
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3. International instruments and obligations for states
It is of the utmost importance for understanding of this paper to stress the complexity of
the situation that the refugee crisis was. Crisis in which many intertwined problems occur on all
levels of internal and international scale of one country. As it was already said, migrant waves
were a legal, moral, and logistical crisis. In the following part many of the mentioned problems
will be explained and grouped regarding their source. It is very hard to lay out difficulties of the
crisis in an orderly fashion. The confusion that could arise after this chapter can be a good wake
up call to see both sides of the crisis and to understand that it is impossible to resolve all
problems by the book, in a legal or a moral view.
The most significant legal source related to the subject is the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter referred to as Refugee Convention). The Convention
prescribes that it is forbidden to expel or return refugees to a country where they may face
persecution, with the exception if they pose a security threat for the country in question.7
Moreover, no refugee or the asylum seeker can be penalized because of the illegal entry. There
are some presumptions for the aforementioned prescription. For example, a direct entry from a
country where their life is threatened, valid reasons for illegal entry and an obligation to contact
the administrative bodies of that country.8 Of course, the mentioned legal standards are
interpreted broader and they are clearly applicable to the refugee crisis.9 The Refugee
Convention was appended with the 1967 Protocol Relating to the status of Refugees. Article 33
says: "No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion".10 In the literature there are commentaries that the Refugee Convention was imagined as
a functional compromise based on international cooperation. Compromise where neighboring
countries would keep their borders opened for refugees to shelter and support them. The problem
is that neighboring countries where usually poorer, so distant countries where to provide funding
7

Text of the Covention and the Protocol available at: http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10, last checked on:
21/03/2018.
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centar za javnu upravu i javne financije, Zagreb, 2016, p. 55.
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Ibid.
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and help with that burden.11 The real problem started when those “poor” refugees started coming
to the borders of wealthier countries. No more were only Cold war, dissidents from the
communist countries, applying for the asylum in the west. That was a point in time when the
regime for entry in rich countries started to shift in a way that non-entrée term was introduced in
legal systems.12
On the other side, every country has a right to defend its sovereignty and by that to
protect its borders from illegal entries or any security threats. Not only that, European countries
have an international (EU) obligation to protect its borders from unauthorized entries.
Aforementioned obligation is proscribed by the Schengen system which is extended even to
Croatia. For this reason, to enter Croatia and Europe legally, an individual must have valid
traveling documents and enter through specifically designated border crossings in working
scheduled time.13 Exceptions are always possible, and special oversights were made for possible
refugees’ waves.
As it can be seen, there are two extremities in between which sovereign governments are
trying to dance. On one side, there is an international obligation to accept all refugees that are on
their borders, without a possibility to return them or forbid their entrance. On the other side,
European countries have an obligation to all other EU states to protect their borders from illegal
entrances, and with that, to protect safety of their own and EU citizens. Somewhere between
those two ends, refugees are trying to reach their Convention rights - safety and security. In a
process of the described “dance” every country has to bear in mind that their treatment of
refugees has to comply with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, which in a migrant crisis where illegal entries are common can be very
difficult.14 For example, articles like article 2 (right to life), article 3 (prohibition of torture and
other inhuman or degrading treatments or penalties) and article 4 of Protocol 4 (prohibition of

11

Leiserson, E., Securing the Borders against Syrian Refugees: When Non-Admission Means Return,
The Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 42., 2017., p. 194.
12 Orchard, P., A Right to Flee: Refugees, States and the Construction of International Cooperation, 2014,
p. 206.
13 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of
persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code)
14 Nazarski, E., Protection of, or Protection from, Refugees - Reflections on Border Controls and
Movement of Persons at the European Borders, Amsterdam Law Forum, vol. 1, 2008, p. 38.
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collective expulsions).15 The protection under those articles goes far beyond just their proclaimed
name because European Court for Human Rights interprets the European Convention and they
putted the protection bar sky high. It is a great achievement that protection was upgraded for 50
years, but in extraordinary times it is very hard to comply with its standards. It was already
proclaimed that the refugees’ crisis was not just a humanitarian one, but also a legal, moral and a
logistical crisis as well.

3.1. Legal aspects of the refugee crisis
It is important to understand that there was no viable legal basis for the policy of open
borders.16 It was already said that a country has to allow entry to refugees who seek shelter and
are in danger in their home country. On the other hand, as an example German Basic Law doesn't
give a right to invoke asylum to a person coming from a country where his rights from Refugee
Convention are assured.17 Furthermore, Refugees Convention’ obligation to accept people is not
definitive18 because there is an exception regarding security threat Also, all EU states have an
obligation to check credentials of people entering EU on its external borders, especially having
in mind the security risk behind terrorist threats. With that being said, this doesn't mean that
countries have to close gates because there are possible threats. It just emphasizes that there is an
obligation to check every individual in the process of providing security and shelter for refugees.
European Union is characterized as a slow bureaucratic giant that is not prepared or even
not capable to create mechanisms for quick reaction for its vital interest. Long before any refugee
crisis, there were already problems in the EU regarding common migration policies. Migration
was a subject on which member states would call up on their sovereignty and proclaiming that
they know what is best for their country.19 The final result was a compromise where “EU had a
15

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, text available
at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf, last checked: 21/3/2018.
16 Peukert, A.; Hillgruber, C.; Foerste, U.; Putzke, H., To Allow or Refuse Entry: What Does the Law
Demand in the Refugee Crisis at Europe`s Internal State Borders, German Law Journal, Vol 18., No. 3,
2017, p. 618.
17 Ibid.
18 Op. Cit., note 11, Leiserson, E., p. 206.
19 Op. Cit., note 14, Nazarski, E., p. 39.
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clear competence, such in a case of visa policy, for the rest it has limited itself to a mere
coordinating role of disparate national actions of willing member states”.20 To show how slow
the EU really is, an extract from G. Papagianni paper is interesting in a way that she detected
how EU policy “is to a large extent a series of either unrelated or overlapping initiatives with no
proper follow up, or attempts to react to ad hoc problems and is largely focused on security
related aspects.”21 In addition, she proposed a tighter cooperation of EU members because they
have failed to react to Arab spring small number of inflows.22 Interestingly, the paper was
written in 2013, two years before the real crisis, and with plenty of time to create a suitable
mechanism.
As a conclusion of this paragraph, there was an evident lack of common EU mechanism
which created a void, filled with uncertainty. This resulted with border EU countries “washing
their hands” and going with their variation of “open borders” policy where they opened borders
but just for the transition of refugees further into EU. They had no legal basis for that policy and
there were procedural mistakes which resulted in infringement procedure against Croatia.23 It can
be said that governments can violate not only rights of refugees, but also of its own citizens and
other EU members by reluctantly discarding international obligations and security checks. It is
distinct that the EU had an extraordinary response to the refugee crisis where there was no rule
of law and the result was an extraordinary legal uncertainty.

3.2. Moral aspects of the refugee crisis
Legal obligations have been explained, and a metaphor of how the Refugee
Convention was imagined has been presented. It was supposed to be a compromise between
already developed and still developing countries where they would bear the burden together, one
side financially and the other logistically. There is a critical question arising in this paragraph can the refugees go directly to wealthy countries? Moreover, what if transit countries decide that
it is better for them to transfer refugees than to have them at their doorstep trying to proceed by
force. Can developed countries decline their entry?
20

Papagianni, G., Forging an External EU Migration Policy: From Externalisation of Border
Management to a Comprehensive Policy, European Journal of Migration and Law, No. 15, 2013, p. 293.
21 Ibid., p. 294.
22 Ibid., p. 298.
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2015/20151210_3_en last
checked: 21/3/2018
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It was stressed how public, and most importantly, experts said that no country can easily
refuse or return a refugee, no matter where he comes from, or through which country he has
passed. But is that so universally true? Do refugees have a right to choose where they will be
refugees? No one can fight the rights they have, and it truly is an international obligation to
provide them with safety, security and health necessities. But if a person decides that they don’t
want to be a refugee in a poor country, but rather a refugee in a developed state on another
continent, do they become an economic migrant because of that “thought-out” decision? If that is
allowed, then there is a very thin distinction between being a refugee and an economic migrant.
The health and help standard that would be offered to refugees is nowhere near the same in
developing countries surrounded by war and in the developed western countries. Consequently,
enormous duties and burdens could stumble upon rich countries because there are 50 million
displaced people in the world from 2014 on24, and only 15% of the refugees affected by the war
in Syria, headed to Europe.25 If all of them arrived to the developed countries, nobody could
guarantee their social systems would sustain providing a high standard of help to this mass of
people. Commentaries in literature say that despite the enormous probable burden that could
befall rich countries, they have a moral obligation to open borders in a world where inequality
between states has been much reduced.26 They start with a perspective of western countries
“illegitimate privilege” that their countries wealth represent for them, and that is why they need
to open borders.27 The real question is to what extent is this principle just a nice wish instead of a
realistic ground for immigration politics. Even if we assume that countries could follow up that
idea, it is clearly inapplicable in a time of huge refugee waves and crisis. Once more, there are 50
million displaced people in the world, and creating systems that could sustain inflows of this
volume is nearly impossible.
That is the main reason why developed countries look for a way out from the refugees’
crisis, but it is questionable if the way they are doing it is legal or moral. For example, Australia
came up with the “stop the boats” action, where they stop refugees before they reach Australia

24

Brennan, F., Human Rights and the National Interest: The Case Study of Asylum, Migration, and
National Border Protection, Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 47,
2016, p. 51.
25 Op. Cit., note 14, Nazarski, E., p. 41.
26 Op. Cit., note 24, Brennan, F., p. 53.
27 Ibid.
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and offer resettlement in less desirable countries like Nauru and Papua New Guinea.28 Australia's
Government interprets international law in a way that refugees have the right to seek a country
and invoke asylum procedures, but no one has the right to enter or remain in a country in which
they are not a national.29 EU also has interception programs where they try to stop boats coming
from Africa, or they have deals with Turkey providing them with financial support, and in return
Turkey does not let refugees through.30 It is a legitimate question is it justified to publicly
announce that you are in compliance with international laws but in the background make deals
with countries such as Turkey, Libya and Egypt which will stop refugees’ inflow even when
refugees’ rights are being breached.31
Also, if a country decides to accept only a part of the refugees, through refugee quotas,
how can we justify that as moral. For example, if a million refugees need asylum but a certain
EU state decides it will accept only 50,000 people, what is with the rest of them. If there is a
legal obligation to allow entry to every true refugee, then increasing a quota number, while the
majority is still closed on some border, cannot be morally justified. On the other hand, it was
emphasized what kind of an economic, cultural and social change a huge refugee inflow could
bring to a certain country. No country in this world would be able to execute such a program, so
there is morality in providing help in third countries away from their borders. By all means, it is
extremely hard to follow international legal and moral obligations during emergency situations
and the refugee crisis in the EU countries was exactly that. There were many unanswered
questions and doubts regarding the morally right thing to do. In other words, the refugee crisis
was clearly an extraordinary moral test for both the public and the governments.

3.3. Logistical aspects of the refugee crisis
Usually there are no major, extraordinary shifts at the state borders in time of peace. For
that reason, border police have the number of personnel that is sufficient to do its’ primary duty
and monitor possible illegal entries in the country. In Croatia, that number amounts to 6000,
precisely to 4700 policemen at external boundaries on 2300 km of land border.32 What happens
28
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in extraordinary situations when the scope of border police work extents their personnel
possibilities? For example, in a time of a refugee crisis. To exemplify a situation that occurred, a
land border between Croatia and Serbia can be analyzed as a proof of the extraordinary
conditions in the refugee crisis. Land border between Croatia and Serbia is approximately 300
km long. In the event of “closing borders” policy, refugees and migrants would have to group in
front of some country’s boundaries. Let's say that happens along 300 km of the Croatia-Serbia
border. Official numbers state that 6500 refugees passed daily through that land border. 33 With
that intensity of refugees’ inflow, in two weeks there would be around 100,000 refugees. If that
number is applied to the length of the land border, it would mean that there would be one refugee
on every three meters of Croatia-Serbia border. Moreover, it is unthinkable to understand how
4,700 police officers could stop that number of refugees from possible illegal entries in Croatia.
Once again, that is the number of police personnel for the whole country, not just Croatia-Serbia
border.
Furthermore, refugees that once entered Croatia would need help settling and acquiring
basic health necessities. Government shouldn't count on civil society or international
organizations support, and it would need to ensure refugees with enough people to provide basic
help. It is obvious that EU countries were not equipped with enough personnel to cope with the
refugee crisis. Some may think that this would be a ground reason to close border gates,
otherwise their country could end up overwhelmed with the chaotic refugee inflow. This just
shows that, for example Croatia, was not only unprepared to stop illegal entries, it was
unprepared to logistically help refugees in efficient way. But it cannot be forgotten that all states
have an international obligation to help refugees that ask for aid in front of their borders if they
are not a security threat. That is why closing borders is not the right response, but enough
personnel to accomplish international obligations is a solution.
That argument should offer a new perspective on military forces at state borders, it is an
easy and justifiable reason why governments call upon army forces to serve at country gates.
Clearly, army forces have war connotations linked to them. Therefore, their jurisdiction, mission
and goals must be well presented to the public and refugees. Next paragraph will analyze

33
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last checked: 22/03/2018.
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different possibilities in which army forces could serve at borders, and most importantly - can
military be a justified mean for “closing gates” policy.

3.4. Can an EU state have a “closed gate” policy, and use military to impose it
on the borders?
There are two main starting points for this argument. Firstly, a country has a legal
commitment to aid and allow entry to every refugee at their border. On the other hand, no
sovereign state needs to tolerate illegal entries or allow entry to possible security threats or
economic migrants pretending as refugees. Those two main principles can easily be conflicted.
In a great refugee wave, there is a possible collision of those two starting points with two
solutions. Government can recognize the extraordinary situation and lack of personnel to handle
a refugee crisis and decide to ignore the security threat and allow entry to everyone at their
borders. In that solution, government has ignored its’ legal obligations and has possibly allowed
entry to many economic migrants and possible terrorists. With the second decision, country can
decide to ignore its obligation to grant asylum to refugees, but by closing gates no terrorist or
“unwanted” economic migrant can enter.
Army forces could be used to impose both solutions, but to what extent can that be legal,
legitimate and moral? In the first case, borders are opened and military (if there is a legal ground
in the legislative for their actions) can be used for logistical help to refugees. Especially if
otherwise, because of personnel shortage, that standard of help couldn`t be achieved. That kind
of use is legal, legitimate and moral. Prior to answering if military can be used to impose second
solution, the “closed gates” policy, the reality of that policy must be tested.
That test can effectively be shown on the example of the refugee crisis in Croatia. It has
been said that the refugee inflow was 6500 person a day on Croatia-Serbia border. In the event of
closing borders, every day there would be more and more refugees waiting. Bear in mind,
refugees from Syria have passed half of the world to get to the gates of Europe, and they will not
just turn around, which is understandable from their point of view. In a matter of few weeks,
there could have been hundreds of thousands refugees at state borders, all eager to continue their
journey to EU security. In that situation, too many refugees could group and it would be
impossible to restrain their journey. No fences, personnel, or policy could stop them.
Aforementioned example of 100,000 refugees at Croatia-Serbia border can be a good test.
11

Refugees could spread in a way that there would be one of them on every 3 meters of the
Croatia-Serbia border. At one point of time, some of them would pass the fences and patrols.
Soon, a great number of refugees could follow. Particularly if they would group themselves and
spread to other unsupervised borders.34 Armies could be sent to strengthen borders and stop
them, but as the number of refugees would increase so would the pressure on borders. Naturally,
the force to apprehend refugees that army should use would increase as well. At some point,
lethal force could be needed to stop refugees. That scenario, of army shooting at refugees can be
easily described as a war on refugees. That is a breaking point were army use on borders
becomes excessive and questionable.
Country could close borders under safety and security reasons. They could say that the
refugee inflow is too great to handle their domestic and international border obligations. It could
be used as a reason to temporarily close states gates and send army to impose the rule of law on
borders. A possibility of a great number of terrorist hidden in the refugee waves exists, and that
is a scenario were army use in closing gates is legal, legitimate and moral. But what if they need
to use lethal force on refugees to assure integrity of borders. If that possibility is not
acknowledged in a time of a refugee crisis, then international obligations of security and safety
formed in the rule of law on the borders cannot be acknowledged as well. Meaning, the only
solution in a migrant wave is to let them through and risk the security and safety border duty.
That decision would not need military at the borders, and questions and troubles that come with
it.

4. Distinction between police and army forces with regards to border
competence
Arguments that indicate the seriousness of the refugee crisis have been shown. No
country could be able to orderly respond to the crisis with the personnel they normally dispose.
The question and reason of calling upon military forces have arisen in the public and this paper.
Still, wherever such a suggestion breaks, it gets fierce response. To indicate all benefits and
possible troubles from military interference, both sides of the proposition must be examined.

Op. Cit., note 32, Staničić, F., professor had reached the same conclusion regarding the impossibility of
closed gates policy
34
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4.1. Arguments against military forces at borders
The mere thought of the military is associated with assault guns and war zones. But are
thoughts like that enough to stop proposition of army forces at borders or are objective and
reasonable arguments needed as well? As far as this research has gone, there are not a lot of
arguments that would deny the justification for military in this case. Primarily, arguments against
military at borders are connected to the basic separation between army and police. Military
forces have traditionally been used for attacking or defending other countries through wars, far
away from homeland. The second main duty was defending the sovereignty and people of their
own state against external aggressions. Only the police were imagined as a legitimate force to
impose laws and will of their own government, not military. That is why armies cannot serve at
borders and impose the state’s rule of law.
Historically, police dealt with internal threats, it contained and stopped riots, enforced the
legal regime, but with less force to soften and hide the use of sovereign power, as opposed to the
military.35 If armies are allowed to border, that would be characterized as a militarization of
borders. Consequently, militarization of borders is a part of a broader process to militarize the
state authorities, and that can never be a positive matter for citizens and democracy. 36 After
terrorist attacks in the USA, the distinction of army-police competence started to lose importance
in favor of militarization. However, people of USA do not want their soldiers to be policemen, or
policemen to be soldiers, as Bert Tussing recognized the inexplicable mindset embedded in
people.37 There is one historic connotation that could explain a mindset as that in the USA. The
Posse Comitatus Act, a federal law that sets the limits for army personnel to execute law
enforcement activities at home.38 It was originally introduced in 1878 to stop federal army to
impose legislative on southern states, but with time it overtook different notion. Today, it is the
main argument in the USA against military in domestic tasks. Chambers attributes that thought
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to public aversion from army in the states jurisdiction, and to the desire of military leaders to
withhold their personnel from participating in domestic emergencies.39
There are lot of evidences for the border militarization in the EU, as well. For example,
interception programs on external EU borders are conducted by military or paramilitary groups
from non-EU countries.40 Also, images from Hungary in the heat of the refugee crisis are hard to
forget. Hungary has built a “110 mile long fence” at their border, and has used extreme measures
against migrants.41 In addition, Jones and Johnson stress that US Border Patrol agents shot and
killed 28 people from 2010 to 2014, while there were 20,000 deaths at the borders of the EU in
the past decade.42 It is clear that roles of both police and military are changing, limits of the
change are still unknown, but the number of deaths is rising along with the money budgets for
“border militarization”.43

4.2. Arguments for military forces at borders
The world is changing, everyday it's smaller and faster. Many connected issues are
progressing and new challenges are emerging. Harsh developments have affected borders as
well. Old system of borders and sovereign states is challenged by cross-border movements of
capital, goods and people.44 Also, new threats for states, like terrorism have arisen, and borders
have been transformed to sites for military security activities, focused on preventing violent
threats from entering.45 Current age is time where total wars are a thing of the past, and armies’
function is shifting in accordance with that process. For example, refugees have been used as
tools in a modern warfare many times, and that is why they are characterized as a security
threat.46 Therefore, army function should shift towards refugees managing, and consequently to
protection of state borders.
Studies have shown that the majority of migrants who attempt to enter the United States
illegally, eventually succeed. Generally, they are apprehended more than once, prior to their
39
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successful entry.47 Data estimates that the odds for the apprehension in any illegal crossing in
2011 was just 20 percent.48 Best instrument for restrainment of illegal entries in the country is
the physical presence of people. Most of the world’s states already have the needed personnel in
their military branches.49 While army functions on external fields are reducing, a moderate shift
of their personnel duties to border security could be the correct measure. Otherwise, it is not
logical to expect from the public to duplicate governments’ assets and capabilities already
contained in the military that can fulfill the assignment.50
Moreover, when somewhere in the world breaks out a crisis, public and governments
easily justify the use of its own armies to intervene in a country across the Earth. In other words,
there aren`t major problems in employing its military personnel to breach some countries
sovereignty under pretenses of helping the domicile citizens. Reports clearly indicate, when
armies are used outside domestic lands, in humanitarian refugee crisis, there is always another
agenda.51 Frequently, military interventions as that end up breaching someone’s sovereignty or
individual human rights.52 Still, humanitarian, and refugee crisis cannot pass without military
presence helping civil organizations. Their role was often portrayed as a “norms entrepreneur”
where they “established a policy of consensus around the protection of the forcibly displaced,
their individual rights protection and created an ethic of intervention”.53 Simple conclusion
emerges, if military has become an inherent element for refugee help abroad, why shouldn't they
assist with same duties at home. Although army help is always considered as a last resort
solution, under properly legislative circumstances, military intervention could steer the refugee
crisis in the right direction. Simply by stopping the illegal entries and logistically helping
refugees seek asylum there would be less concerns and problems.
In a refugee crisis there is always a large group of people crossing borders, and often it is
hard to implement the rule of law and cooperate with them. Experience has shown that in crisis
as that there is a demand to enforce governments rule. While enforcing power on a group of
47
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people as refugees “the real nature of dynamics of violence” exists and must be recognized. 54
Otherwise, government will not be prepared and if they don't impose the rule of law on the
borders of EU, a possible result may be chaos. However, to perform a military intervention that
would be legal, legitimate and moral some preparations are required. Firstly, military presence
and jurisdiction must have a good and precise legal ground.55 Legislative that prescribes military
presence in everyday life must pass a thorough parliament and public discussion. Everyone
addressed by that law, refugees and citizens, should know army's role in the crisis.56
EU states like Hungary have not negotiated militaries function on the borders with the
public, beside violence that is one of the reasons why international public and governments
condemned the use of military in the refugee crisis. But it is forgotten or neglected that the EU
through EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Missions) program that operates under “Security and
Defence” pillar is militarizing the refugee crisis as well. For example, one of EUBAM programs
is to train 500 of Libya military personnel for border operations, and there are many other
programs with the EU support that are executed by military or paramilitary groups.57 Army
presence at borders was labeled as an anomaly, but from what is demonstrated it is clear it will
be a recurring anomaly.58 Therefore, legislative must be adjusted for the new military roles in
humanitarian crisis, abroad and at home.

5. Legislative regarding military in Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia
In last three years some states in the EU decided to respond to the refugee crisis by
sending military to borders. Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia are representative models how
governments differently resolved the problem of sending army troops to the borders. All three
countries are members of the EU, although asylum and migration system is in the EU
jurisdiction, these states have unlike models.
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5.1. Legislative in Hungary
Hungary had grave changes in its legislature regarding refugees and border security.
Their parliament passed on a Law that amended the Police Act and the National Defense Act.
Hungary restricted entry for refugees to the maximum extent and in addition it decided to
severely oppose any attempt of illegal entry.59 Consequently, military forces were appointed with
dangerous and serious powers that could be used in securing borders and against illegal refugees.
The Law allowed army to assist police in checking passports, controlling the flow of migrant
traffic and to detain suspects. However, the law also permits military forces to use non-lethal
force, such as rubber bullets, for border control.60 TV news and reports from Hungarian border in
which force was used against refugees or in which people desperately climbed across the wired
fence have aired all around the world and aroused disturbed comments everywhere. Hungarian
government repeated their stand of securing borders with no-patience for illegal entries attempts.
Still, comments were against any harsh powers imposed on refugees, what showed the tough
possible solutions to the crisis. With great difficulties can someone explain as to where is the thin
line when the open borders policy stops tolerating illegal entries in compliance with international
borders obligations.

5.2. Legislative in Slovenia
Slovenia amended their Defence Act adding article 37.a which prescribes extraordinary
competence for army forces. It says that if the security situation demands, their parliament can,
based on the government's proposal, decide to call upon military forces to secure the borders. To
pass the proposal, Slovenian parliament must vote on it with ⅔ majority. 61 Activation of the
extraordinary competence would appoint following powers to the military at the borders: 1)
warning orders, 2) instructing orders, 3) temporal apprehension, 4) control on groups of people.
Aforementioned powers usually are not in the military’s competences, but on the
government/parliament proposal they can act upon them for maximum of three months, if they

59

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-law/hungary-beefs-up-border-with-armywarns-migrants-to-stay-away-idUSKCN0RL1K220150922?feedType=RSS&amp;feedName=topNews,
last checked on: 24/03/2018
60 http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2015/09/hungary-lawmakers-approve-use-of-non-lethal-weapons-onrefugees.php, last checked on: 24/03/2018.
61 Amendments on the Slovenian Defence Act, text available at: https://www.uradni-list.si/glasilo-uradnilist-rs/vsebina/2015-01-3750?sop=2015-01-3750 (on Slovenian), last checked on: 24/03/2018.
17

are not extended.62 The amendments to the Defense Act came after the crisis “exceeded all
manageable possibilities”, but the extraordinary competence were not abused on the refugees,
and the act had a thorough public and legislative procedure.63 Result of the legislative was an Act
that gives adequate enough powers for the military to help in the crisis without hidden agendas
that could militarize borders or the society and provoke a serious public critique.

5.3. Legislative in Croatia
Croatia has also amended its laws, allowing military to serve at borders, but with
considerably differences considering what Hungary and Slovenia did. Croatian government
proposed, and the parliament passed on the amendment to the Defence Act and Border Control
Act. Article 62.a of the Defence Act now allows military to give support to the police in securing
the border. Minister of defence suggests the military use but the government must allow it with
prior permission from the President of The Republic of Croatia.64 Army can support police
accordingly to the Border Control Act, article 5, prescribing that military can be called upon
borders because of security or humanitarian reasons. In addition, the Act clearly says that army
forces have to oblige police commands while serving at borders.65
Background to amendments in both Hungary and Slovenia were security reasons, where
governments realized that the refugee crisis has become logistically impossible to regulate in
accordance with border security obligations. That was the main reason to send additional
personnel through military forces to borders. To fight any illegal attempts or threats and help in
the arrangement of refugee transfers through their territory. The same background existed in
Croatia, but it was unusual how amendments have not provided military with police powers like
in Slovenia. Croatia had frequent needs for military intervention in its past, and in any
humanitarian and environmental extraordinary situation they are called to serve. Consequently,
seeing army forces on first lines in extraordinary situations was not strange in the public, it was
even expected from them to arrive and support. Moreover, the Croatian Constitution allows
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military forces to aid police and other public bodies in extraordinary situation.66 Throughout this
whole paper, the extraordinary in legal, humanitarian and logistical sense of the refugee crisis
was emphasized. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper and to clear any misunderstanding,
Ministry of the Interior was contacted to determine intentions and goals behind aforementioned
Croatian amendments to the laws.
Questions addressed to the Ministry had to clarify if there is a possibility for military to
use force at borders, or if they can help in any way against illegal activities, and if not, what are
armies possible duties at borders.
First question said “In your interpretation of the Border Control Act, can military forces
have police powers at state borders?”. The Ministry responded that “upon providing support to
the police in border security, military forces are not allowed to exercise police powers”. Which
would mean that Ministry officials are familiar with the legislative regime, and the possible
consequences if new migrant waves arrive. Secondly, “In the event of a new migrant wave, can
military forces be used to restrain any illegal entries in Croatia?”. Answer says “military forces
would not be used in tasks and sites where they can have a direct contact with illegal migrants.”.
Lastly, they resolved the question of what duties would army personnel have at borders, where
they provided a broad list of possible tasks. For example, military would help in the migrant
transport, data collection, supervision with and without technology, air surveillance, food and
water deliveries, help and rescue missions, infrastructure works, sea patrolling etc.67
Now that the EU has already accepted a minimum of 1.5 million refugees and migrants, it
is a fair question if the new refugee wave would be welcomed. Especially after knowing about
interception programs, and EU-Turkey deal. In Croatian surrounding, two EU members have
given police powers to the military, and in case of “closed gate” policies implemented
throughout EU, they are prepared to stop any illegal attempt to enter their territory. That would
mean that under current legal regime, Croatia could easily end up as a hotspot for refugees and
migrants as a EU frontier. That is not necessarily unwanted, if they won`t to allow refugees to
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their territory and aid them if they seek help. However, Croatian government has repeatedly
stated that they do not intend to become a refugee hotspot, and even with military that would
have police powers it would be hard to implement “closed gate” policy, and without that, it
would be logistically impossible.

6. Epilogue of military at borders legislation changes
Firstly, difference between arguments for army forces at borders that are articulated in the
USA or in the EU must be stressed. The USA is confronted with a continuous and vast migrant
inflow. In addition, in the USA there are mostly economic migrants at borders, not refugees as in
EU. Justification for military use is not the same, in the USA there are no extraordinary issues,
the migrant inflow is steady and long standing. The solution for border control is not in sending
army forces to borders, military should be contained for warfare and extraordinary domestic
matters. The EU, refugee crisis is an entirely different issue. Refugee wave of millions persons in
two years is an extraordinary situation that calls for extraordinary measures.
Any sovereign country has international obligation that by the principle of the rule of law
must be obliged. Refugees that are not security threats must be granted an asylum, and illegal
entries across borders should be stopped. Thus, if both of mentioned standards are followed, in a
refugee crisis equalized with an extraordinary situation, military forces can be used. Most
important is to stop extremism, bans and fear on one side and illegal entries, activities or
impossible expectations on the other side. The theory of the social contract should be used as a
groundwork for a solution. First societies, the people, have decided to waive some of their rights
originated from the absolute freedom, in exchange for security. If they all have an absolute
freedom they are all judges for themselves. Because life as that is unsustainable, they abdicated
absolute freedom by abandoning some of the rights and freedoms in the name of security
presented as a sovereign and legitimate rule they accept. 68 In the 2015 crisis, refugees that until
then accepted another culture and states sovereign, arrived in great number to EU. Groups of
refugees were so vast that extraordinary measures were necessary, and entirety of them sought
not only safety they were deprived in their homeland, they sought rights from a sovereign they
did not acknowledged before. In other words, vast groups of refugees by invoking asylum and
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rights of that country, concluded a new social contract with a new sovereign rule they accept.
Therefore, they must be clear that by invoking new rights they accept new obligations. If they are
able to acquire rights only because of the extraordinary situation, then their rights are
extraordinary and consequently so can be their obligations. Because of that, domicile citizens
that revolt against refugees must be familiar with that concept. If refugees are getting benefits
they “do not deserve”, they can be balanced with the obligations that will ease EU citizens, for
example measures securing safety that ordinarily may not be imposed on them. On the other
hand, people that reject refugees, and call for “closed gates”, need to understand that they have
the same social contract with the same sovereign that refugees want to conclude. Nobody was
allowed to interfere with their contract, and in the same way they are not entitled to that action.
Because no one can stop another person in achieving his rights and place of living, if they all
abandoned absolute freedom for the same sovereign, the same security and obligations.
After the analysis of all elements of the refugee crisis that could impact on the
justification of military use at borders, the solution is simple. The use of military forces in
extraordinary situations at borders is legal, legitimate and moral if basic international obligations
are obliged. But as for the army role in the “closed gate” policy, it can be legal and legitimate if
the safety of its own citizen cannot be assured. But, as of the moment that lethal force is needed
to stop the refugees, when the war on refugee engages, it is impossible to moraly rationalize and
justify the use of military forces.

7. Conclusion
In the end, not to repeat the deduction from the last paragraph, only some considerations
must be emphasized. The refugee crisis was a legal, humanitarian, logistics and moral crisis. The
number of people that chaotically arrived to the EU raised many questions and uncertainties.
Mostly no solutions were offered, and those that were, had a divided support. There are
obligations and rights as for refugees and as for countries. For the answer, the theory of the
social contract proposes a well-balanced aspect to the refugee crisis and it should be recognized
in the future. For now, wars all still waged, refugees still exist, and only 15% of those that are
affected by the war in Syria arrived in the EU. If a new migrant wave reaches Croatia their
government will have troubles, but with right military policies they could avoid them. Only if
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international obligations are fulfilled, refugees are safe under the asylum protection, and safety
measures and a social contract are conducted at the state border.
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